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ANTITRUST, THE GIG ECONOMY, AND
LABOR MARKET POWER
MARSHALL STEINBAUM*
I
INTRODUCTION: DECLINING LABOR POWER IS (PARTLY) AN ANTITRUST
STORY
Worker bargaining power has diminished over the last forty years. Between
1948 and 1979, median wages closely tracked output per worker.1 Since then,
productivity has continued to increase (until leveling off in the decade of the
2000s), while median pay has stagnated, creating an ever-widening gap between
median wages and productivity. The widening gap contrasts with the central
prediction of neoclassical economic theory about the labor market: that workers
are paid what they are worth.2 At the same time, inequality within the distribution
of labor income is higher, and has risen faster, than can possibly be explained by
any notion of a skills gap between workers and the needs of today’s employers.3
And since the 2000s, these dual trends demarcating the declining bargaining
power of workers in the economy have been joined by a third: the reduction in
labor’s share of national income, which economists had assumed was stable over
the long run. In fact, it has ratcheted downward over the last two business cycles.4
The aim of this paper is to augment the interpretation of these trends with an
element that has received very little attention from labor-oriented scholars: the
decline and erosion of antitrust law and its enforcement. Whereas there was once
a sharp line where labor law ended and antitrust began, there is now a gray area,
within which a more powerful firm can tell a less-powerful contractor or worker
what to do without being liable under antitrust or labor law. The erosion of the
statutory employment relationship, and thus the ability of employers to evade the
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2. Id.
3. Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts:
Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q. J. ECON. 2, 533–609 (2018).
4. David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23396, 2017); Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares
(2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the
State).
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obligations that go along with it, has received wide attention from labor scholars
and in public debate. What has been ignored is that the deterioration of antitrust
is what legally allows more powerful firms to tell subordinate firms, contractors,
and workers what to do even if those subordinates are not, legally, their
employees. Antitrust has also prevented those same subordinates from
coordinating among themselves to strengthen their own hand in negotiations.
This paper considers two different ways that antitrust has contributed to the
increasing imbalance of power between employers and workers. First, antitrust
has legalized vertical restraints, allowing the economy’s most powerful actors to
closely direct and supervise the behavior of less-powerful actors. Second,
antitrust has been used by those same powerful actors to prevent less-powerful
actors from organizing and coordinating on their own behalf against such
concentrations of power. Parts II and III of this article deal with each of these,
and the Part IV proposes a policy agenda for putting the antitrust laws to work
in the labor market according to their original purpose: namely, to deconcentrate economic power.
II
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND THE FISSURED WORKPLACE
David Weil’s book The Fissured Workplace describes a crucial component of
the decline in labor’s bargaining power: the gradual disappearance of the
traditional, and statutory, employment relationship.5 Instead of uniting workers
at different levels of the labor market hierarchy (wages, skills, and social
prestige), the contemporary corporation has become a mechanism for
segregating low-wage (and even some middle-wage) workers from the economy’s
dominant decision-makers: the executives and shareholders of the economy’s
leading corporations and the financial institutions that own and control them.
Although most workers remain statutory employees of some employer, they are
increasingly remote from the decision-making entity that exerts power over their
day-to-day lives and terms of work.6
Weil is himself a former senior official responsible for enforcing federal labor
law, and he rightly points to the ease with which employers can evade that law by
re-classifying workers as either independent contractors or as employees of their
contractors as a crucial element in legalizing this fissured business model.7 Many
other scholars and organizations, including worker organizations, have
emphasized changes in labor law that are very important to understanding how
these trends erode worker bargaining power in the economy and ensure that it
takes the form of inter-firm wage segregation.8 Specifically, the National Labor
5. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Nelson Lichtenstein, Two Cheers for Global Integration: Corporate Governance in a World of
Global Supply Chains, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 329–58 (2017); MAYA PINTO,
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Relations Act9 and the Fair Labor Standards Act,10 as well as numerous other
state and federal labor regulations, impose tests for statutory employment as a
necessary precondition for a worker to enjoy their protections. Increasingly,
employers who classify their workers as exempt contractors rather than
employees are able to pass these tests, thanks to deferential court rulings,11
technologies that enable employers to manage workers from afar, and industry
deregulation that legalizes new, vertically dis-integrated business models in a
given sector, among many other causes. These all give employers both the legal
means and the pecuniary motive to push their workers outside the legal
boundaries of the firm under whose effective control they remain.
Weil’s research is classified methodologically as industry case studies of what
he calls the “lead firms” that direct and control a series of contractors and
affiliates that actually employ the workers and do the work. His findings have
been confirmed by more traditional economics studies of inter-firm earnings
inequality using matched employer-employee data from a variety of sources.12
For instance, Song and others used social security records to document the rise
in inter-firm inequality; increasingly, the highest-paid workers work for the firms
where average pay is the highest.13 This is not because those firms are inherently
more productive than other firms due to their firm-specific characteristics, but
rather that they have gotten better at sorting out well-paid and highly-educated
workers and excluding low- and middle-wage workers from their employment.14
A study by Abowd and others of data from state unemployment insurance
records verifies these distinctions, and attaches further significance to working at
a well-paid firm. Not only do workers earn more now, but they do so for the rest
of their careers.15 “High-paying firms facilitate moving workers to the top of the
earnings distribution and keeping them there.”16 Labor market surveys paint a
similar picture.17
In a competitive labor market, the identity of a worker’s firm is irrelevant to
what he or she gets paid, because if any worker were paid less than they were
worth they would quickly switch to a job offering them their competitive market
wage. In a competitive labor market equilibrium, all firms pay the same to all
REBECCA SMITH & IRENE TUNG, RIGHTS AT RISK: GIG COMPANIES’ CAMPAIGN TO UPEND
EMPLOYMENT AS WE KNOW IT (2019) https://www.nelp.org/publication/rights-at-risk-gig-companiescampaign-to-upend-employment-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/9KHV-XWRD].
9. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
10. Fair Labor Standards Act, 55 Stat. 756 (1941).
11. Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106291.
12. Id.
13. Jae Song et al., Firming Up Inequality, 134 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1–50 (2019).
14. Id.
15. John M. Abowd et al., Earnings Inequality and Mobility Trends in the United States: Nationally
Representative Estimates from Longitudinally Linked Employer-Employee Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 23224, 2017).
16. Id.
17. See Damir Cosic, Wage Distribution in Large and Small Firms (November 21, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the International Labour Review).
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workers with similar characteristics. In reality, though, firms have considerable
discretion to dictate pay, because outside job offers are sufficiently hard to obtain
that it is unlikely that workers will have the option to leave.18 In other words,
labor markets are not competitive, as evidenced by the increasing earnings
inequality between firms. The aforementioned research on inter-firm inequality
shows that workers are increasingly remote from profits and from centers of
economic power.19 Anyone familiar with the history of labor organizing, worker
solidarity, and the conditions for social mobility can recognize that under those
conditions, it’s impossible for workers to benefit from economic growth. An
article from the New York Times in 2017 made this point by contrasting the
experience of janitors working at the corporate headquarters of Kodak in the
early 1980s versus Apple today. The Kodak janitor was employed by the
company, enjoyed a tuition subsidy as part of her benefits package, learned how
to use inventory software as part of obtaining a college degree on the job, and
ultimately worked her way up within Kodak to be head of IT for the whole
company. 20 Meanwhile, the Apple janitor is employed by a contracted, franchised
janitorial services firm, enjoys no part of the benefits package of an Apple
employee, and has no chance of obtaining a promotion up the hierarchy of what
is now one of the economy’s most valuable single firms.21
The antitrust side of the story of the separation of workers from lead firms is
the simultaneous erosion in the jurisprudence of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions
on vertical restraints. In the context of antitrust, a vertical restraint is a
contractual provision or mode of operation that restricts the autonomy of the
counterparty in the case where each party operates at a distinct segment of the
supply chain. For example, if an automobile manufacturing company operates a
network of independently owned dealerships, and its dealers are forbidden from
selling within a given radius of another authorized dealer’s location, that is
territorial exclusivity, a non-price vertical restraint. If such a contract imposes the
final retail price of said automobiles, that is vertical price-fixing, or in antitrust
lingo, resale price maintenance, which can be either a minimum or a maximum
(or both, in the case of one definite price at which the car would be re-sold).
Other vertical restraints include the varieties of exclusive practices that suppliers
might impose on their affiliated dealers or distributors, like compulsory purchase
contracts—known as full-line forcing or requirements contracts.22

18. Abowd et al, supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Neil Irwin, To Understand Rising Inequality, Consider the Janitors at Two Top Companies, Then
N.Y.
TIMES:
THE
UPSHOT
(September
3,
2017),
and
Now,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/03/upshot/to-understand-rising-inequality-consider-the-janitors-attwo-top-companies-then-and-now.html [https://perma.cc/Q83S-VWWK].
21. Id.
22. See CHARLOTTE SLAIMAN, DECODING ANTITRUST LAW: A PRIMER FOR ADVOCATES (2019),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/documents/decoding-antitrust-law-a-primer-for-advocates
[https://perma.cc/KL5C-9ZEG]
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Such exclusive dealing was the subject of the 1951 antitrust case United States
v. Richfield Oil Co.23 The case concerned the relations between a dominant oil
refiner and gasoline supplier—Richfield Oil—and its affiliated service stations,
which were required to source their gasoline solely from Richfield and to carry
exclusively retail auto parts, sponsored products, according to supply contracts
negotiated by Richfield, rather than seeking out and negotiating their own
sources of supply according to their customers’ preferences. The court ruled
unequivocally for the government on the grounds that it exercised de facto
control over these “independent business men,” in contravention of the antitrust
laws, despite the fact that they were not employees of the company. That case
created a sharp distinction and a comprehensive delineation between the realm
of labor and antitrust: if subordinate entities are “independent business men” and
not employees, it is illegal to exercise control. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the same basic principle against coercion of non-employees by vertical
supply contract in the 1964 case Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California.24
It is precisely through the erosion of the Richfield Oil standard that the
fissured workplace has been allowed to come about. Independent business
people are independent for the purposes of evading labor law, but once pushed
outside the border of the firm, the restrictions antitrust places on their
domination have been all but erased. As such, what Weil calls lead firms can
continue to exercise control and direct their business operations by contract.25
Those contracts would once have been illegal, before antitrust jurisprudence
began to search out spurious justifications for their immunity on the basis of
supposed efficiency.26 For example, manufacturers would want their branded
distributors to be bound by contractual provisions to ensure that dealers
represent the brand effectively to customers, rather than hide their poor
customer service behind the brand’s overall prestige, or that they must contribute
to its marketing budget and abide by its standardized branding and pricing
policies. Theoretically, this would serve the overall collective interest of the
supplier-distributor network. The efficiencies to be gained by permitting
franchisors to exercise overall direction and control were assumed to flow
eventually to consumers in the form of increased output, enhanced variety or
quality, or lower prices—all reflecting the fact that vertical control exercised this
way is, in fact, pro- rather than anti-competitive and therefore ought not to be
penalized by the antitrust laws.27

23. See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S. D. Cal., 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S. 922
(1952).
24. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
25. WEIL, supra note 5.
26. See Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, J. L. ECON. 86 (1960); Thomas
R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, Bureau of
Economics Staff Report to the FTC (1983).
27. See ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING, 291–
301 (2005) (containing an explicit argument for permitting franchisors to exercise vertical control in these
ways).
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Brian Callaci lays out how this process occurred in one sector, so-called
business-format franchising.28 As he writes, “While the economic boundaries of
the firm correspond to the extent of centrally planned and hierarchically
coordinated production, the legal boundaries are set in politically contested
legislatures and courts. Exploiting or creating mismatches between the two has
enabled corporations to enjoy economic benefits of vertical integration while
avoiding many of the legal risks and costs.”29 In the case of franchising, that took
the exact form that courts had ruled illegal in Richfield Oil and Simpson v. Union
Oil Co. of California: franchisors licensed their trademarks and business models
to an army of franchisees, who would be granted exclusive territories in exchange
for agreeing to exclusive supply contracts, all enforced by the threat of dealer
terminations.
Economists, particularly those operating in the Law and Economics tradition,
have interpreted the rise of these hybrid structures, part firm, part market
organizations, as reflecting the evolution of an efficient allocation of coordination
rights and the alignment of incentives between principal and agent so as to
remove the need for direct supervision and take advantage of economies of scale
and specialization.30 But Callaci shows that, in fact, the advent and spread of
franchising was not due to the law catching up with the natural evolution of a
business model marked by superior efficiency. Rather, it is due to a concerted
lobbying campaign31 to pry apart the sharp border between labor and antitrust
represented by Richfield Oil and grow a whole business model in the legal gray
area.32 As far as antitrust was concerned, the operation was meant to roll back
the per se illegality of non-price vertical restraints that existed in antitrust
following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
in 1967, and the per se illegality for maximum resale price maintenance that
existed following the Court’s ruling in Albrecht v. Herald Company in 1968.33
With the Court’s decisions in Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania in 1977 and
in State Oil Co. v. Khan in 1997, antitrust immunity for vertical integration by
contract was complete.34
It was not just antitrust where franchisors and their trade association were
able to have their way. In 1966, the Small Business Administration re-classified
franchisees as independent to avail themselves of subsidized federal loans,

28. Brian Callaci, Control Without Responsibility: The Legal Creation of Franchising 1960-1980
(December 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington Center for Equitable Growth).
29. Id.
30. See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 27; Francine LaFontaine &
Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, 29 (Pablo Buccirossi ed., 2005).
31. Callaci, supra note 28, at 4.
32. LaFontaine & Slade, supra note 30.
33. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967).
34. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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despite concerns that this was essentially financing the marketing and distribution
activities of some of the economy’s largest and most powerful corporations.35 The
general counsel to the agency, Philip F. Zeidman, who had advocated internally
for that policy change, subsequently served as counsel to the International
Franchise Association for almost four decades.36 Just last year, the inspector
general of the SBA concluded that its loans to poultry growers are likely illegal
because those small businesses are in fact under such direct control from the
major poultry integrators—Perdue, Tysons, and Koch Poultry—that the farmers
cannot be considered small businesses.37
In addition to their treatment of franchisees as independent in order to
qualify them for subsidized loans, the franchisors were successful at limiting the
definition of joint employer under the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act so that they could not legally be considered employers of
their franchisees’ workers.38 That made any attempt by workers to bargain
collectively against both franchisees and franchisors a secondary boycott, a
practice expressly prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act.39 Altogether, these
changes gave franchisors maximum control, but minimal responsibility, and led
the business models of franchisees toward poor treatment of low-wage workers,
since franchisees have few, if any other margins, in which to exercise their
autonomy in order to increase profits.
Recently, the issue of no-poaching restrictions in franchising contracts has
drawn attention from researchers,40 elected officials,41 and antitrust enforcers.42
In such contracts, franchisees commit not to hire workers employed by
franchisees elsewhere in the franchising network of which they are a member.
Correspondingly, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has made its
view known to a federal court where private litigation against such a no-poach
provision is underway. It argued that no-poaching provisions in franchise
agreements are akin to other restrictive vertical contractual provisions in
franchising contracts and hence subject to the rule of reason, the permissive
standard put in place by Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania and State Oil Co.

35. Callaci, supra note 28, at 13.
36. Id. at 21.
37. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SMALL BUS. ASSOC., EVALUATION OF SBA 7(A) LOANS MADE
TO POULTRY FARMERS (March 6, 2018).
38. Econ. Policy Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding Standard for Determining
Joint-Employer Status (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/joint-employer-comments-feb2019/ [https://perma.cc/84FQ-FGBV].
39. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 §8(b)(4)(b) (1947).
40. See, e.g., Brian Callaci, Vertical Power and the Creation of a Fissured Workplace: The Case of
Franchising (November 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington Center for
Equitable Growth); Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion
in the Franchise Sector (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 24831, 2017).
41. See, e.g., S. 2480, 115th Cong. (2018).
42. See, e.g., Corrected Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Stigar v. Dough
Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. March 8, 2019).
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v. Khan.43 The DOJ specifically rejects the idea that franchising networks are
hub-and-spoke arrangements,44 therefore that no-poach clauses might be
horizontal agreements not to compete and thus illegal per se. This intervention
by the DOJ leans against the relatively pro-enforcement posture it expressed in
2016 in its “Guidance for Human Resource Professionals.”45 The prior
administration never stated whether no-poaching provisions in franchising
contracts were to be treated as per se illegal or considered under the rule of
reason. But alongside the unwillingness of the NLRB to extend dual-employer
status to franchisors as well as franchisees (and notwithstanding a recent federal
appellate ruling constraining its ability to do so),46 this use of no-poach clauses
reflects powerful employers’ ability to direct and restrict the activities and
employment of their workers, without being answerable in any way to those
workers themselves.
The contentions the DOJ makes in its statement of interest are in conflict with
the economics of no-poaching agreements in labor markets where employer
market power is pervasive.47 There is no functional difference between a series of
uniform, bilateral, putatively vertical no-poaching agreements, collectively
barring franchisees in a franchising network from hiring workers from elsewhere
in the network, and a single multilateral, putatively horizontal no-poaching
agreement between the individual franchisees. Those two things have the same
anti-competitive effect on labor markets. Thus, antitrust law should not treat
them differently based on the horizontal versus vertical formalism. The DOJ
brief appeals to the potential for countervailing efficiencies that swayed the
Supreme Court to abandon per se treatment of non-price vertical restraints in
Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania. Notably, however, those ostensible
benefits accrue to consumers, not to workers, if they accrue to anyone at all other
than the company imposing the restraint. If antitrust law implicates competition
in labor markets as well as competition in output markets, as the DOJ agrees is
the case, then it should not justify anti-competitive restraints that harm workers
by making the labor market less competitive by claiming they might benefit
consumers.48 Moreover, the amicus curiae brief filed by the Attorney General of
Washington State points out that franchising networks contain both franchisorowned and franchisee-owned establishments, rendering a no-poaching
agreement binding on franchisees likely to restrain them from hiring retail
43. Id.
44. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
PROFESSIONALS (2016).
45. Id.
46. See Rachel M. Cohen, Workers Just Notched a Rare Win in Federal Court, THE INTERCEPT
(January
3,
2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/03/nlrb-joint-employer-ruling/
[https://perma.cc/33WE-TM36].
47. See generally José Azar et al., Measuring Labor Market Power Two Ways, AEA PAPERS &
PROCEEDINGS (forthcoming May 2019); Arindrajit Dube et al., Monopsony in Online Labor Markets,
AER: INSIGHTS (forthcoming June 2019); Douglas A. Webber, Firm Market Power and the Earnings
Distribution, 35 LAB. ECON., 123-134 (2015).
48. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUST, supra note 44.
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workers employed by franchisors.49 Altogether, the pending litigation over
franchising no-poaching agreements highlights antitrust’s tolerance for restraints
that bind both franchisees and their workers. This belies recent claims by several
antitrust authorities that labor markets and product markets are treated
symmetrically under current antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement.50 They are
not.
More recently than the expansion of franchising under permissive antitrust
treatment is the advent of the so-called gig economy: the deployment of
independent contractor status for workers, not just for the independent
businesses who employ them. This makes each individual worker an independent
business, and thus denuded of any protections under labor law. However, they
can simultaneously be controlled entirely by employer/customers without the
protections and stability of the employment relationship enshrined in statute
during the New Deal. This is the business model that online labor platforms like
Uber, Lyft, Handy, and Care.com have perfected: under the law, workers deal
bilaterally with gigs whose employers have none of the standard obligations of
employers, while the platform operates the entire labor market to its own
benefit—what Sanjukta Paul has called a “for-profit hiring hall.”51 This is enabled
by the GPS technology of monitoring workers, the ability of the platform to
dictate the terms on which participants will transact, the use of customer ratings
as a pretext for de-activation rather than direct supervision, and the immunity of
all of this from any regulatory scrutiny or collective bargaining on the part of
workers of any sort.
In 2016, an Uber customer filed an antitrust suit against Uber52 and its CEO
in New York claiming that it amounted to a price- and wage-fixing conspiracy
among hundreds of thousands of independent businesses—its drivers, for whom
Uber determines and dictates the terms on which its drivers are allocated
customers and the prices that will be charged to them, including the share earned
by the driver.53 The genesis of the suit was the repeated failed efforts to have
drivers classified as employees under state and federal labor regulations. To
defeat those suits, Uber claimed to be a software company licensing its service

49. Brief for the Attorney General of Washington as Amicus Curiae, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc.,
No. 2:18-cv-00244-SAB (E.D. Wash. March 11, 2019).
50. See C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers That Harm Sellers, 127 YALE L.J. 7, 2078
(2018); Letter from Federal Trade Commission Acting Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen to Senator Cory
Booker (December 1, 2017) (on file with author).
51. Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and Its Implications,
38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 2, 233, 233 (2017).
52. The suit was initially filed against just the CEO, Travis Kalanick, as a means to avoid the
mandatory arbitration clause that eventually kicked the case out of court, but Uber was later joined as a
defendant.
53. Marshall Steinbaum, Uber’s Antitrust Problem, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 11, 2016),
https://prospect.org/article/uber%E2%80%99s-antitrust-problem
[https://perma.cc/8SPD-YBJD];
Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust Implications of Labor Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (May
2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/CPI-Steinbaum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2EY-49CS].
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to independent drivers for the ease of contacting potential customers. As such,
they did not employ the drivers, nor did Uber directly provide transportation to
customers.
If drivers are not employees, so the theory behind the antitrust suit went, then
they must be independent businesses, and hence Uber setting the terms on which
they transact with customers, including fixing the prices charged to customers,
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act’s ban on restraints of trade. In this
respect, the plaintiff was helped by the precedent set by the Apple E-books
antitrust case, which proceeded against Apple and five book publishers for
conspiring to set up an alternative E-books platform to Amazon’s.54 That case
was ruled to be a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and thus per se illegal.55 If Apple and
five book publishers is hub-and-spoke, why not Uber and a hundred thousand
drivers?56
In the end, Meyer v. Kalanick, was sent to arbitration rather than litigation
thanks to the mandatory arbitration clause included in Uber’s terms of service.
Therefore, the issue of whether Uber is a price-fixing conspiracy, and whether
that price-fixing is horizontal, was never resolved at trial. But Uber did
commission at least two economics papers that signal what its antitrust defense
would have been: Uber’s control over its drivers, including price-fixing, benefits
customers because it increases the consumer surplus in the ridesharing market.57
This illustrates the core reason why all of these business models that
subordinate the interests of workers, franchisees, and suppliers generally to those
of dominant buyers obtain immunity from antitrust law as it is currently
interpreted: the consumer welfare standard, which holds that the sole metric for
assessing harm to competition within the meaning of the antitrust laws is the
effect on consumers, and in practice, the effect on prices charged to consumers.58
If the restrictions operated by Uber, by franchisors, by poultry integrators, and
by powerful businesses generally can be shown to benefit consumers, or at least
not to harm them, then they are ipso facto immune from antitrust liability.
This constriction of what the antitrust laws prohibit is a far cry from Richfield
Oil, which contains an overt analysis of power dynamics in the supplierdistributor relationship as the reason why antitrust must lean against such a

54. United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (2013).
55. Id.
56. On the other hand, in the Apple E-books case, the publishers organized among themselves as
part of negotiating the entry of Apple’s rival e-books platform. Arguably this is not the case with Uber
or other ridesharing platforms, or labor platforms generally, in which there is no meaningful agreement
among the many gig workers.
57. See, e.g., Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22627, 2016); Jonathan V. Hall et al., Labor Market
Equilibration: Evidence from Uber (October 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
58. Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard
INSTITUTE
(2018),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpfor
Antitrust,
ROOSEVELT
content/uploads/2018/09/The-Effective-Competition-Standard-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6DXU6NH].
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concentration of power on behalf of the dominant entity.59 Instead, the
attenuated conception of economics that has developed more recently within
legal reasoning and jurisprudence—consumer welfare and price effects as the
sole criterion of harm to competition—explains much of how the labor market
and the economy generally got to where it is today. In particular, how workers
and contractors have been prevented from accessing the profits generated by the
economy’s leading firms through the exercise of unilateral power to dictate the
contractual terms. Thanks to that, workers suffer from wage stagnation and a
deterioration in job quality, including total control by the entity that is,
economically, if not legally, their boss.
Two further aspects of the ridesharing platform business model are worth
pointing out here: surveillance and non-linear driver pay structures. In the
summer of 2018, a team of company-affiliated economists released yet another
paper pointing to Uber’s ostensibly efficiency-enhancing business model.60 The
researchers compared the tendency of Uber drivers to shirk by taking longerdistance routes between the same two endpoints to the tendency of New York
City taxi drivers to do the same. The meaningful differences between the two
groups consisted of routes taken for fares originating at LaGuardia Airport and
terminating in Manhattan. The researchers found that Uber drivers tend to shirk
less than do taxi drivers, which they attribute to the fact that both Uber itself and
the customer in the back seat can monitor the driver in real time using GPS,
whereas traditional taxi drivers retain more discretion, and apparently use it to
increase their take-home pay at riders’ expense. But the ability to monitor
employees in real time is part of both the statutory definition of employment and
the economic concept of control. According to the paper, Uber’s use of
monitoring technology to improve the service enjoyed by its customers is exactly
the context in which we would recognize that an employment relationship exists
and grant rights to the employee.61 Instead, Uber drivers remain subordinate to
Uber, which sets their fares and the share they take home. Taxi drivers, on the
other hand, are normally also independent contractors, but they are genuinely
more independent in that they are not monitored in real time. And neither they
nor the medallion owner (if the driver does not own his own medallion) has
discretion to set prices. Instead, fares in the taxi market are regulated.
Uber was also found to be operating a program nicknamed “Hell” that
monitored whether drivers were multi-homing (i.e., logging into more than one
ridesharing platform simultaneously to choose between competing fares) or
single-homing and penalized the ones that were not taking customers on the Uber
platform exclusively.62 More generally, the ridesharing companies operate bonus59. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280.
60. Meng Liu et al., Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Ubers and Taxis,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25015, 2018).
61. Id.
62. Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui & Julian Nowag, Buyer Power in the Big Data and Algorithm
Driven World: The Uber & Lyft Example, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/buyer-power-in-the-big-data-and-algorithm-driven-
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based driver pay policies with a low base rate and a bonus for achieving a certain
acceptance rate, or service in a given geographic area.63 This system effectively
requires sole use of a single app and following that app’s directions about where
and when to work in order to win. While not technically requiring exclusivity on
the part of drivers, this pay structure makes it very likely.64 And while such
exclusive dealing (and market division, if there were to be any agreement to
engage in similar non-linear bonus-based pay policies between Uber and Lyft)
might be thought to implicate antitrust, those companies have seemingly faced
no public enforcement since the Meyer v. Kalanick case was forced into
arbitration.
These instances of increasing control of drivers by ridesharing platforms
correspond to the general picture of ride-sharing employment that Alex
Rosenblat paints in her recent book Uberland.65 Rosenblat argues that the labor
platforms are re-making the terms of employment to their own liking, exercising
power over price-setting, quality and terms of service, and all manner of other
relevant margins to customers and to workers, while disclaiming all
responsibility.66 Initially, Uber and similar online labor platforms presented
themselves as neutral market-makers matching drivers to customers,
ameliorating the search frictions inherent in any labor market through the
innovative application of new technology.67 Now, though, the platforms present
their contribution to public welfare more as arising directly from their control
over the market and its participants, rather than from their neutral facilitation of
bilateral transactions. This hybrid business model of total control but no
responsibility as an employer is one optimized not only to the erosion of labor
protections, but also to the erosion of antitrust’s restrictions on vertical restraints.
In fact, it is highly reminiscent of the arguments found in the Law and Economics
literature validating antitrust’s increasing permissiveness toward vertical
restraints on the grounds that the concentration and consolidation of power
within the economy is economically efficient.68 However, there’s nothing optimal
or efficient about it, other than the efficient use of regulatory arbitrage to
dominate and extract rents from every other counterparty and stakeholder in the
market without having to follow the laws that bind everyone else.

world-the-uber-lyft-example/ [https://perma.cc/FHR7-KJPG].
63. See ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF
WORK 138–166 (2018).
64. Julian Nowag, When Sharing Platforms Fix Sellers’ Prices, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 3, 382–408
(2018).
65. See ROSENBLAT, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. See Nicholas Buchholz, Spatial Equilibrium, Search Frictions, and Dynamic Efficiency in the
Taxi Industry (July 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Princeton University) (presenting
Uber and similar platforms as reducing search frictions).
68. See Telser, supra note 26; Overstreet, supra note 26; BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 30.
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III
ANTITRUST AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE GIG ECONOMY
The erosion of antitrust in the direction of permitting vertical price- and nonprice restraints has effectively legalized labor outsourcing, misclassification, and
the gig economy. This has resulted in dominant firms having access to a wider
range of profitable business models that exert greater power and control over
workers than they once did. Fundamentally, this trend within antitrust is in the
direction of increasing the power of the economy’s most powerful actors.
The flip side of this is that antitrust law has also made it more difficult for less
powerful actors to collectively mitigate such power inequities. Sandeep Vaheesan
refers to Albert Hirschman to make this point: not only has antitrust made it
harder for workers and small businesses to exit in order to exercise countervailing
power; it has also prevented them from using voice to do so.69 All of the
mechanisms of concentrated power described in Part II could be categorized as
curtailing workers’ use of exit strategies to evade the control of their employers.
This Part focuses on antitrust’s dual opposition to worker voice.
Between the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932, the federal antitrust enforcers used the former to curtail the
collective bargaining activities of militant (and effective) labor organizing. In
1892, the Supreme Court ruled that the Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of
New Orleans was illegal coordination by labor groups in violation of the Sherman
Act’s ban on restraints of trade.70 In 1894, the Cleveland Administration accused
Eugene V. Debs, the head of the American Railway Union, of entering into
criminal restraints of trade for organizing the Pullman Strike, including a
nationwide boycott of trains carrying Pullman Cars. In fact, as the Supreme Court
ultimately ruled on the case, the Sherman Act proved to be unnecessary: the
Court held that the government could obtain an injunction against the strike and
imprisonment of Debs without any statutory authorization, as it amounted to an
exercise of its legitimate law enforcement powers to crush civil unrest.71
Likewise, in the 1908 case Loewe v. Lawlor, a company that had been
targeted by a nationwide boycott on the part of the American Federation of
Labor successfully sued the union trying to obtain recognition as its workers’
bargaining agent under the Sherman Act.72 The Supreme Court agreed that such
a boycott was an illegal restraint of trade and forced the union and its members
to pay treble damages to their employer.73 These three cases show that the
antitrust laws were a potent weapon in the hands of employers seeking to prevent
unionization. During the same period, the government struggled half-heartedly
to find a way to use the Sherman Act to limit corporate power, but it moved
69. Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded
Ages, Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
70. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 U.S. 994 (1892).
71. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1985).
72. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
73. Id.
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decisively, with the full cooperation of the judiciary, to use it to curtail labor
power.74
The Clayton Act of 1914 included an exemption for labor from the antitrust
laws,75 but courts interpreted it narrowly such that secondary boycotts were still
illegal.76 It was not until the Norris-LaGuardia Act that unions were entirely
immunized from antitrust liability. But in the jurisprudence of the so-called labor
exemption that developed in the decade or so thereafter, antitrust immunity
came to be connected to statutory employment status, like the right to collectively
bargain itself.77 Therefore, in the current era of the erosion of statutory
employment, we also have the erosion of the antitrust labor exemption.
The Federal Trade Commission has undertaken a long-running campaign
against collective action by associations of professionals who seek to constrain
entry, and in some cases, to forbid their members from soliciting business away
from fellow members and to set minimum prices for their services. The
commission has brought such cases against doctors, church organists, ice-skating
instructors, music teachers, and public defenders.78 This enforcement line has
accompanied a push by the agency to reduce state action, meaning the regulatory
authority of states or municipalities to displace competition in favor of some
other legitimate policy goal, notwithstanding prohibitions in federal law. For
example, municipal taxi regulatory regimes, which limit the total number of taxis
on the road, impede entry into the taxi business. However, this impediment has
the legitimate purpose of preventing market saturation, thereby ensuring that
driving a taxi is a viable full-time job. It also hopefully ensures that coverage is
universal in both time and space and that a customer unfamiliar with the city can
obtain a licensed and qualified professional rather than an unsafe or just
unqualified service provider. Some of the FTC’s campaign against restrictions on
competition in the market for service professionals consisted of attacks on
licensing regimes that effectively protect incumbents and limit competition. The
FTC’s “economic liberty task force” is devoted to this, as was the case the FTC
litigated to the Supreme Court in 2015 and won: North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners.79 The ruling held that a state board consisting primarily of members
of the profession being regulated could not benefit from the state action
exemption.80

74. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890-1916 (1988).
75. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 USCS §§1–12 (2006).
76. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 433 (1921).
77. See Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective
Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016).
78. See Sandeep Vaheesan, How Contemporary Antitrust Robs Workers of Power, L. & P. ECON.
BLOG (July 19, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/07/19/how-contemporary-antitrust-robs-workers-ofpower [https://perma.cc/84MQ-Q4XZ].
79. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
80. Id.
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Even before the recent campaign against the state action exemption, the FTC
involved itself in efforts by independent contractors to organize themselves in
response to the trucking deregulation that de-unionized the sector in the late
1970s. Port truckers aspired to bargain collectively against logistics companies
that were coordinating trucking services on behalf of powerful wholesalers and
retailers and subjected them to low pay, long hours, and thus high turnover. The
FTC as well as quasi-public entities like port authorities intervened on behalf of
those companies and accused the truckers of violating the Sherman Act during
organizing drives in the late 1990s and 2000s.81 This stance is consonant with the
rationale behind trucking and transportation deregulation in the first place: that
inefficient suppliers, middlemen, and stakeholders were preventing efficiencies
attending to unitary control from being realized in regulated industries.
Therefore, competition in the deregulation era would drive down the rents being
earned by those insiders. Permitting truckers to bargain collectively as
contractors once they had been de-unionized would have sacrificed all those
supposed gains. The FTC also dissuaded Ohio from passing a state law that would
have allowed independent contractor home health aides to bargain collectively
with staffing companies and their clients in 2008.82
The logic for these types of enforcement decisions can be found in the
consumer welfare standard, just as was the case for vertical restraints imposed by
dominant firms: protecting consumers is all that matters, and consumers are
protected best when the most efficient firms have sufficient power and discretion
to control the market, including at multiple levels of the supply chain, without
having to reckon with any other stakeholder. On this reasoning, collective action
by port truckers, home health aides, church organists, or gig economy workers is
inefficient rent-seeking, and antitrust action against it “protects competition, not
competitors.” The superior efficiency to be found in, for example, Uber having
the power to surveil, direct, and fix prices for its drivers, despite their
independent contractor status, would be threatened if drivers had the power to
mediate that surveillance or price-setting through any kind of co-determination.
It is against this background of hostility to state and local regulation and
collective bargaining that the FTC and the Department of Justice intervened in
another antitrust case involving Uber. After the lawsuits alleging employment
misclassification against Uber had been sent to arbitration, the Seattle City
Council passed an ordinance granting collective bargaining rights to ridesharing
drivers who are not employees.83 The Chamber of Commerce, acting on behalf
of Uber, filed an antitrust claim against the city for facilitating a violation of the
Sherman Act: collective bargaining over wages and working conditions by nonemployee drivers.84 After the federal district court sided with the city that its
81. See Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L.REV. (forthcoming
2020).
82. Vaheesan, supra note 78.
83. United States Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
84. Id.
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ordinance was covered by the state action exemption,85 the federal antitrust
agencies filed an amicus brief in circuit court alleging that the state action
exemption was limited to the customer-facing side of the taxi market and thus
did not cover anti-competitive regulation of ride-sharing drivers.86 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court,87 setting up an antitrust
trial about whether the ridesharing collective bargaining ordinance was, in fact,
anti-competitive. The federal agencies further suggested in their brief that if not
covered by the state action exemption, driver collective bargaining is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, a naked restraint with no possible pro-competitive
justification.88
Rather than fight the case on the merits, Seattle modified the ordinance to
remove collective bargaining over wages, in the hope of at least salvaging some
version of collective bargaining without running afoul of antitrust laws.89 But the
Chamber has apparently not been satisfied by that significant concession; in
renewed filings, it demanded that the ordinance be wholly abandoned, because
naming an exclusive bargaining agent for ridesharing drivers amounts to an
illegal group boycott against any driver who does not wish to be represented
collectively.90
At this point, it is clear that the federal agencies are fully behind the use of
antitrust laws to undermine worker bargaining power, just as much as they are
behind the non-use of the antitrust laws against employer power and control in
the fissured workplace. As Sanjukta Paul has pointed out, if the church organist
professional organization had, instead of publishing guidelines preventing its
members from underbidding one another for gigs, programmed an app to match
organists to churches seeking their services, and prevented their members from
performing at a church matched to another member via the app, the antitrust
authorities would have been just as solicitous of the organists’ app as they have
been of Uber’s price-fixing and market-division business model—provided the
organists’ app had been operated in the interest of a “for-profit hiring hall” like
Uber, as opposed to in the interest of the organists themselves.91 That
jurisprudence and disposition of enforcement resources effectively means that
Uber drivers or organists as workers are paying a significant price to the unitary
85. Id.
86. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant and in Favor of Reversal, United States Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d
769 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-35640) [hereinafter Brief].
87. United States Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018).
88. Brief, supra note 86.
89. Michelle Baruchman, Battle Continues Over Pay, Collective Bargaining for Uber, Lyft Drivers
in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES, December 22, 2018, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/transportation/battle-continues-over-pay-collective-bargaining-for-uber-lyft-drivers-in-seattle/
[https://perma.cc/XUQ5-RR57]
90. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, United States Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Seattle, No. 17-cv-00370-RSL (W.D. Wash. March 29, 2019).
91. See Sanjukta Paul, Fissuring and the Firm Exemption 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 3, 2019,
at 65.
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platforms coordinating the labor market in which those workers sell their services
for the privilege of restraining trade and avoiding a free-for-all.92 Should any
antitrust case against Uber for price-fixing, exclusion, or market division ever see
the light of day after Meyer v. Kalanick, it’s likely that the agencies would take
the view that its restraints are vertical and hence subject to the Rule of Reason
(as the DOJ has argued in the litigation over no-poaching clauses in franchising
contracts93), rather than per se illegal like non-employee driver collective
bargaining. As Sandeep Vaheesan has phrased it, antitrust is about
“accommodating capital and policing labor.”94
IV
CONCLUSION: USING ANTITRUST TO RE-BALANCE POWER IN LABOR
MARKETS
This paper sets out an important but under-appreciated aspect of the rise in
labor market precarity and diminishing worker bargaining power: the erosion of
antitrust laws restricting dominant firms’ ability to use vertical restraints to
control and restrict both less powerful affiliates and the workers who work for
them, and the concurrent use of antitrust against any attempt by those workers
or independent businessmen or contractors to bargain collectively against such
concentrations of power. In ascertaining the causes of contemporary inequality
in wealth, income, and social status, especially with respect to the labor market,
we cannot overlook the role that antitrust has played.
This contrasts with a recent Economic Policy Institute paper by Heidi
Shierholz and Josh Bivens that treats the rise of employer power in labor
markets, and the extent to which weakening antitrust has caused that
phenomenon, as a less important cause of rising inequality and stagnant wages
compared to the erosion of labor law and thus of collective bargaining.95 Their
evidence for the contention that diminishing worker bargaining power matters
more than concentrated employer bargaining power is that inequality within the
distribution of labor income is a more significant cause of stagnating wages and
the growing gap between median worker pay and average worker productivity
than is the declining labor share of national income, which is of more recent
vintage than either of the first two economic trends.
But we cannot map rising labor income inequality to worker bargaining
power and labor law and the declining labor share of income to employer power
and antitrust so neatly. As the analysis in Parts II and III show, income inequality

92. See Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L.REV. (forthcoming
2020).
93. See Boris Bershteyn et al., DOJ Is Trying to Rein In Franchise No-Poach Suits, LAW360
(February 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-is-trying-to-rein-infranchise-no-poach-suits [https://perma.cc/73AW-NW22].
94. Vaheesan, supra note 69.
95. Josh Bivens & Heidi Shierholz, What Labor Market Changes Have Generated Inequality and
Wage Suppression?, ECON. POL’Y INST. (December 12, 2018).
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is to a large extent caused by rising earnings inequality between firms, rather than
between workers, reflecting employer power to set wages. This is the result of the
legalization of business models like the fissured workplace that allow powerful
employers to segregate workers from the profits they earn for their bosses. The
point of Part II of this paper is that the fissured workplace is the product of both
labor regulation and antitrust. Thus, increasing inequality of power between
employers and workers cannot be coherently treated as two separate
phenomena: rising employer power, and declining worker power.
That means the solution to unequal bargaining power is not necessarily or not
entirely an antitrust solution, but antitrust must play a major part, since it
implicates the business models available to the economy’s dominant firms. In
particular, we should seek, through revived antitrust and labor regulations that
both take account of how the economy actually works, and how power is
exercised within it, to re-establish the sharp distinction embodied in Richfield Oil.
Either workers are employees, in which case they can be controlled by their
bosses, who in turn owe them statutory protections including the right to bargain
collectively, or they are independent businesses, in which case they cannot be
coerced by contract or by any other means. Proposals to extend and strengthen
labor law tests for statutory employment to take account of gig economy
technologies are crucial, but they will be ineffective so long as employers and lead
firms retain the strong incentive to push workers outside their protection. The
role of antitrust in that context is to create a significant cost to so doing: the
potential for treble damages under antitrust liability should a lead firm be caught
coordinating and directing the activities of its non-employee subsidiaries and
contractors. That is the mechanism that would weigh against employers’
incentive to mis-classify.
Putting such an antitrust regime in place entails the abandonment of both the
consumer welfare standard and, with it, the Chicago School’s jurisprudence of
vertical restraints. Instead, any vertical restraint, price or non-price, should be a
presumptive violation of the Sherman Act if it is imposed by a firm with market
power. And antitrust’s definition of market power must, in turn, be expanded
beyond the confined market-share-based Sherman Act jurisprudence to instead
take account of the many ways economists have of testing for the existence of
market power. Firms would be judged to have market power if they:
• Have the power to unilaterally raise prices for their customers or
lower them for their suppliers, including workers;
• Wage- or price-discriminate among customers, suppliers, or workers;
• Unilaterally impose non-price, uncompensated contractual provisions
on their counterparties, like non-compete agreements in labor
contracts;
• Impede or control entry by would-be competitors; or
• Earn profits and/or make payments to their shareholders at a rate in
excess of their market cost of capital.
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All of these things are economic indicia of market power because they could
not be done by any one or more firms acting in concert in the face of competition
from rivals—therefore they should be legal indicia of market power as well.96
Drilling down on how the antitrust laws should target labor market
monopsony in particular, not merely prohibit vertical restraints that enable
fissured workplace-style business models, the antitrust authorities should bring a
monopsonization suit against an online labor platform like Uber that fixes wages
and imposes exclusivity on independent businesses, along the lines of Meyer v.
Kalanick. If, as would be expected, that case would be adjudicated under the Rule
of Reason, despite its economic equivalence to the FTC’s per se cases against
professional organizations and unions of independent contractors, then Congress
should streamline the Rule of Reason for labor monopsony. This should be done
along the lines proposed by Ioana Marinescu and Eric Posner, setting out
principles to guide market definition that are responsive to measured firm-level
labor supply elasticities.97 In fact, if firms have the unilateral power to dictate
wages without causing a significant share of their workforce to leave, then the
proper market definition for a monopsonization case may be significantly smaller
than the one those authors recommend as a baseline. The point of such a suit is
to force Uber to choose one business model or another: either employ the drivers
if Uber wants to fix their wages and monitor them on the job, or give up the pricesetting and market coordination power that makes the platform such a value
proposition for its investors. It cannot be allowed to do both. Meanwhile, workers
themselves who are not statutory employees should be protected by antitrust’s
labor exemption and should be permitted to bargain collectively. However, any
such extension of the labor exemption must not also immunize the powerful
employer against whom they would seek to bargain. And at the very least, both
no-poaching clauses in franchising contracts and non-compete clauses in
employment contracts should be illegal per se.98
Finally, analysis of labor market impact should be incorporated in the
statutory prospective merger review process that federal agencies undertake as a
matter of routine, in order to prevent the harmful accumulation of monopsony
power in labor markets by merger. The current FTC Chairman, Joseph Simons,
said as much in Congressional testimony in the fall of 2018,99 but to date there is
no evidence that any such investigation has taken place. In the recent merger
96. See Steinbaum & Stucke, supra note 58.
97. Ioana Marinescu & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal to Enhance Antitrust Protection Against Labor
Market Monopsony (December 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Roosevelt
Institute).
98. See Petition for FTC Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non-Compete Clauses, OPEN MKTS INST.
(March
20,
2019),
https://openmarketsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Petition-forRulemaking-to-Prohibit-Worker-Non-Compete-Clauses.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AL4A-MUTV]
(petitioning the Federal Trade Commission to undertake an administrative rule-making to make
noncompete clauses illegal per se).
99. Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the United States Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (October 3, 2018) (statement of Joseph Simons, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
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approval for Staples’s takeover of its supplier Essendant, the majority of the
commission claimed that the merger would have a pro-competitive impact on
input markets.100 Specifically, if the combined firm reduced the price it pays to
manufacturer, it would in fact purchase more from them, not less, and hence that
price reduction would not be an exercise of buyer power (the majority’s opinion
says nothing about labor specifically as an input). But the idea that the volume of
sales is dispositive about the anti-competitive exercise of monopsony power is
not correct. Wilmers finds evidence that dominant retailers and manufacturers
impose price reductions on the suppliers over whom they exercise market power,
and those suppliers in turn pass those price reductions through to their workers
in the form of lower wages.101 That is an exercise of monopsony power, but it
might well be accompanied by greater sales volume from the supplier to the
dominant customer.
Altogether, the thesis of this paper is that there is no way to confront the
economy’s crisis of unequal bargaining power without confronting the role that
antitrust has played in getting us there. Antitrust is not a substitute to any of the
many other ways that policy ought to be extended to halt and reverse the
economy-wide erosion of worker bargaining power behind rising inequality and
wage stagnation. But strengthening it is a necessary condition for the success of
many of those alternatives, notably, labor law reform and collective bargaining
on the part of precariously employed gig economy workers.

100. Statement of Chairman Joseph J. Simons et al., Concerning the Proposed Acquisition of
Essendant,
Inc.
by
Staples,
Inc.,
FTC
File
No.
181-0180
(Jan.
28,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1448328/181_0180_staples_essendant_majority_statement_1-28-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZ7L-7DVJ].
101. Nathan Wilmers, Wage Stagnation and Buyer Power: How Buyer-Supplier Relations Affect U.S.
Workers’ Wages, 1978 to 2014, 83 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 2, 213–42 (2018).

